Fundamental challenges of contemporary “personality” research: comment on “personality from a cognitive-biological perspective” by Y. Neuman by Uher, Jana
  
Jana Uher 
Fundamental challenges of contemporary 
“personality” research: comment on 
“personality from a cognitive-biological 
perspective” by Y. Neuman 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Uher, Jana (2014) Fundamental challenges of contemporary “personality” research: comment on 
“personality from a cognitive-biological perspective” by Y. Neuman. Physics of Life Reviews, 11 
(4). pp. 695-696. ISSN 1571-0645  
 
DOI: 10.1016/j.plrev.2014.10.005 
 
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/63578/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: September 2015 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
Uher, J. (2014). Fundamental challenges of contemporary "personality" research. Physics of Life Reviews, 11, 
695-696. 
       1 
REPRINT 
Comment 
 
Fundamental Challenges of Contemporary “Personality” Research 
Comment on "Personality from a Cognitive-Biological Perspective" by Y. Neuman 
 
Jana Uher 1,2* 
 
1
 The London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom; 
2 Comparative Differential and Personality Psychology, Free University Berlin, Germany 
 
* Correspondence: 
The London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Psychology,  
St Clements Building, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom 
e-mail: mail@janauher.com 
 
The growing interest in “personality” from scientists of ever more diverse fields demands conceptual 
integrations—and reveals fundamental challenges. For what is “personality” given that “it” is explored 
in humans and nonhuman species, that people encode “it” in their everyday language, scientists seek 
“it” in the brain and study “it” primarily with rating scales? 
Neuman’s review [1] exemplifies that interdisciplinary integrations presuppose critical 
reflections on the metatheories and methodologies applied. The Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-
Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals (TPS-Paradigm) elaborated these foundations [2]. It 
showed that all definitions of “personality” contain the idea of individual-specificity but they differ in the 
particular phenomena being considered [3]. To be specific to an individual, patterns must differ 
between individuals over some time. But differential and temporal patterns cannot be directly 
perceived. Individual-specificity is an idea, an abstract concept constructed by both lay people and 
scientists to denote regularities noticed in repeated observations of many individuals over time [4]. 
Deciding which particular phenomena to consider requires philosophical presuppositions. Can 
psychical phenomena be reduced to “neural substrate” as Neuman [1] proposed, implying monistic 
ideas? Reductionism also overlooks that, in nonliving and living systems, on all levels of organisation 
new properties emerge that cannot be predicted from their constituting elements [5, 6, 7]. 
Lack of differentiation between phenomena of different kind is a major obstacle to progress in 
psychology as it entails applications of inappropriate methodologies. Building on epistemological 
complementarity [8], the TPS-Paradigm differentiates morphology, physiology, behaviour, psyche and 
other kinds of phenomena on the basis of their spatial and temporal properties. Their particular 
constellations of these properties entail that isomorphisms between phenomena of different kind 
cannot be assumed. These spatio-temporal properties also determine unequivocally which 
methodologies are appropriate to explore a given kind of phenomenon, whether it can be scientifically 
quantified and how [2, 9]. 
“Personality” research is afflicted with particular fallacies, many of which derive from mistaking 
linguistic abstractions [10] for concrete entities. Specifically, abstract words and rating items are often 
assumed to directly reflect the phenomena that they describe, but they can reflect only the raters’ 
ideas and beliefs about these phenomena [11, 12]. These fallacies and serious methodological 
deficiencies in widely used standardised questionnaire methods have so far prevented researchers 
from comprehensive taxonomic explorations of individual-specificity in most kinds of phenomena 
studied as “personality” (e.g., experiencing, behaviour) [13]. As individual-specific patterns cannot be 
directly perceived, these reifications [14] imply that the causes of individual-specificity in phenomena 
that are directly perceptible (e.g., behaviour) are located somewhere inside the individual as reflected 
in the Allportian concept of traits used by Neuman [1]. This misleads researchers to confuse 
structures of between-individual differences for within-individual structures, producing inherently 
circular explanations [3,15]. Between-individual analyses (variable- and individual-oriented) are 
needed to identify individual-specificity, but they fail to explore individual-specific functioning and 
development. The TPS-Paradigm highlights that, rather than one universal “personality” model as 
often assumed, models of different kind must be established to taxonomise individual-specific 
compositional structures and process structures in individuals’ averages and their variabilities in each 
given kind of phenomenon, and it therefore provides comprehensive metatheoretical and 
methodological frameworks [13, 15]. 
Overcoming the fallacies of the field and establishing comprehensive taxonomies of 
individual-specificity on the basis of appropriate methodologies will open up new avenues for 
exploring and explaining the origins and causes of “personality”. 
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